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Abstract 
For much of the last decade the EU has been involved in protracted and controversial negotiations with 
the ACP group of countries with the aim of establishing a series of ‘WTO-compatible’ Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In this article, we locate the EPAs within the context of the wider shift in 
EU trade policy towards bilateralism. In doing so, we eschew much of the existing literature within EU 
Studies and, instead, turn to recent work in IPE emphasising the ‘domestic-societal’ and ‘systemic’ drivers 
of preferential liberalisation. Recent strands of this literature have drawn particular attention to the 
presence of a ‘WTO plus’ agenda – including the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ – in driving developed 
countries to compete for preferential access in developing country markets. Although neither domestic-
societal nor systemic pressures are sufficient to explain the EPAs – or indeed EU trade policy more 
generally – drawing attention to the above features allows us to account for why they have gone beyond 
the original remit of ‘WTO compatibility’ and why aspects of the emerging agreements bear close 
similarity to the EU’s supposedly more commercially-oriented bilateral agreements. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
For much of the last decade the European Union (EU) has been involved in controversial 
and protracted negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of 
countries with the aim of establishing a series of ‘World Trade Organisation (WTO)-
compatible’ Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Although these negotiations 
                                                 
 This article is based on a paper first presented to the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, 
Edinburgh, UK, 30 March-1 April 2010. The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers 
for their very helpful comments and suggestions. Any flaws that remain are solely the responsibility of the 
authors. Tony Heron acknowledges the financial support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
(First Grant Scheme Award No. RES-061-25-0198). The article also draws on Gabriel Siles-Brügge’s 
doctoral research, funded by an ESRC Postgraduate Studentship. 
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have generated a great deal of critical commentary and debate (e.g. Babarinde and 
Faber, 2005; Goodison, 2007; Stevens, 2008; Faber and Orbie, 2009), there has been 
little attempt to locate the EPAs within the context of the EU’s wider external trade 
strategy. A feature common to both the EPAs and the EU’s supposedly more 
commercially-oriented free trade agreements (FTAs) is the presence of a ‘WTO plus’ 
agenda, including the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ that originally formed an integral part 
of the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) but were subsequently abandoned 
following the collapse of the Cancún Ministerial in September 2003.1 After Cancún, the 
EU responded – albeit somewhat belatedly – to the United States’ (US) pre-emptive shift 
towards ‘competitive liberalisation’ (Zoellick, 2002) by launching its Global Europe 
trade strategy document in October 2006. The essential thrust of Global Europe was that 
the aim of promoting internal competitiveness and job creation through further 
liberalisation and marketisation under the auspice of the Lisbon Agenda needed to run 
in tandem with a more offensive external trade strategy (see Hay, 2007). More 
particularly, Global Europe signalled the demise of the EU’s self-imposed moratorium on 
commercial FTAs that was introduced in 19992 as part of a policy of multilateralism first 
designed to advance what eventually became the DDA. While Global Europe reaffirmed 
the EU’s continued support for the WTO, it nevertheless argued the case for FTAs going 
                                                 
1 The term ‘Singapore Issues’ refers to those behind-the-border issues that were introduced for the first 
time at the inaugural WTO Ministerial, held in Singapore in December 1996: namely, competition policy; 
transparency in government procurement; trade facilitation and trade and investment. 
2 Although the EU did negotiate a series of bilateral action plans with its Eastern European and 
Mediterranean trade partners during this period – which included WTO plus provisions – these were not 
primarily driven by economic interests but rather by the EU’s geostrategically-motivated European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
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‘further and faster in promoting openness and integration’ by extending coverage to 
issue areas like services, investment, public procurement and competition policy ‘which 
are not ready for multilateral discussions’ (European Commission, 2006d, p. 10). In 
short, Global Europe presaged a shift in the EU’s external commercial strategy from 
multilateralism first to competitive liberalisation. 
 
In the following article, we seek to account for the shift in the EU’s external strategy 
presaged by Global Europe. We do this with a specific focus on the EPAs. Although much 
of the debate about the EPAs has concentrated on the issue of ‘WTO compatibility’, the 
presence of a WTO plus agenda within the negotiations suggests that the agreements 
are, at least in part, driven by a set of independent, political and commercial interests. 
Existing literature within EU Studies, focusing on institutional dynamics and 
bureaucratic preferences within the context of politically-insulated policy structures, 
offers insufficient clues as to why the EU has moved from multilateralism first to 
competitive liberalisation, why WTO plus issues have figured so prominently and why 
this strategy has informed negotiations in its ‘development’ as well as its ‘commercial’ 
FTAs. To address these questions we turn, instead, to an alternative set of theoretical 
explanations borrowed from International Political Economy (IPE) which emphasise the 
‘domestic-societal’ and ‘systemic’ drivers of preferential liberalisation. Recent strands of 
this literature have drawn particular attention to the prominence of services and 
investment liberalisation in driving developed countries to compete for preferential 
access to developing country markets. More specifically, the recent proliferation of 
regional and bilateral FTAs is, in large measure, a reflection of the trade preferences of 
multinational firms seeking to secure ‘first mover’ advantages in highly-regulated 
service markets. Evidence suggests that during the 2000s EU policy-makers were not 
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immune from services industry lobbying against the backdrop of active commercial 
diplomacy elsewhere driven by the actions of the US, Japan and other global 
competitors. These domestic-societal and systemic pressures were reflected in the EU’s 
subsequent bilateral services and investment agenda and, more tangibly, in agreements 
including the EU-CARIFORUM3 EPA and the EU-Korea FTA. Although neither domestic-
societal nor systemic pressures are sufficient to explain the EPAs – or indeed EU trade 
policy more generally – drawing attention to the above features does allow us to 
account for why they have gone beyond the original remit of compatibility with the 
WTO’s legal requirements and why aspects of the emerging agreements bear similarity 
to the EU’s bilateral FTAs. In advancing this argument, the article seeks to make a 
twofold contribution. On the one hand, the article builds on and arguably goes beyond 
recent IPE scholarship focused on the political dynamics of WTO-plus North-South trade 
diplomacy (Phillips, 2005; Shadlen, 2008; Gallagher, 2008; Heron, 2010) by shedding 
further light on the commercial imperatives underpinning preferential liberalisation. On 
the other hand, a more specific aim of the article is to reveal the extent to which EU 
trade policy is more permeable to interest group and systemic influences than usually 
acknowledged – which, in our view, is a necessary first step in bringing its study into the 
political economy mainstream. 
                                                 
3 The Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific states (CARIFORUM) was established in 1992 to 
facilitate cooperation between the English-speaking Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, following the accession of the latter to the Lomé Convention.  Although 13 
of the 15 members of CARIFORUM – Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and 
Trinidad & Tobago –  signed the EPA on 15 October 2008, Guyana initially refused to sign only to do so 
five days later on 20 October. Haiti, which qualifies for EU unilateral trade preferences as a Least-
Developed Country (LDC), signed the EPA on 11 December 2009. 
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The rest of the article is organised as follows.  In the second section, we highlight the 
limitations of institutionalist approaches to EU trade policy and map out an alternative 
IPE explanation that draws particular attention to the role of interest group and 
external competitive pressures in fostering a more aggressive regional and bilateral 
trade strategy, distinct from the EU’s traditional multilateral diplomacy. In the third 
section, we offer a brief, stylised reading of the historical evolution of EU-ACP trade 
diplomacy on the basis of this model. In the fourth section, we consider in more detail 
the foundation of a distinct EU bilateral services and investment agenda; in doing so, we 
focus specifically on the so-called ‘Minimum Platform on Investment’, a template for 
services and investment provisions used by the EU in all of its FTAs since 2006. In the 
process, we aim to uncover the underlying politics behind this by comparing the 
services and investment provisions of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA with those of the 
supposedly more commercially-oriented EU-Korean FTA. Ultimately, we conclude that 
even though it is claimed that the two agreements are driven by fundamentally different 
policy agendas – ‘development cooperation’ versus ‘external competitiveness’ – the 
services and investment provisions are, in fact, derived from the same set of commercial 
and political imperatives. 
 
II. Understanding the ‘politics’ of EU trade policy 
 
The key to much of the existing literature on EU trade policy is the so-called ‘collusive 
delegation’ thesis (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Nicolaïdis and Meunier, 2002; 
Meunier, 2005; Woolcock, 2005; Zimmerman, 2007). By this is meant that national 
governments chose to delegate trade policy-making authority to the supranational 
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Commission in the Treaty of Rome4 in order to ‘insulate the process from protectionist 
pressures and, as a result, promote trade liberalisation’ (Meunier, 2005, p. 8). Since then 
further integration – in particular the Single Market Programme – has entrenched the 
alleged ‘depoliticisation’ of trade-policy making (see Hanson, 1998), thus enabling the 
EU to play a key role in promoting multilateral liberalisation (Woolcock and Hodges, 
1996). The EU’s commitment to multilateralism was the cornerstone of its approach to 
the latter stages of the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and the subsequent Doha Round, 
launched in Qatar in December 2001. Indeed, in 1999 it went so far as to announce a 
self-imposed ‘moratorium’ on new commercial FTAs in order to underscore its 
commitment to the Doha Round (see fn. 2). Despite threats to the contrary, the EU 
maintained this position in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Cancún 
Ministerial in September 2003 when competitors stepped up their efforts to secure 
bilateral trade deals. Even so, it was not too long before the EU’s faith in multilateralism 
began to unravel. In October 2006, following a prolonged lull in the Doha Round, the 
European Commission announced a new trade doctrine when it launched its Global 
Europe strategy document, which advocated a more offensive approach to bilateral 
negotiations. On this basis, the Commission requested negotiating mandates for 
bilateral FTAs with India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
South Korea from the Council of Ministers in 2007, with the first of these – the EU-Korea 
FTA – signed in October 2010. 
                                                 
4 Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome’s Article 113 (subsequently renumbered as Article 133 and now Article 
207 under the Treaty of Lisbon), establishing the so-called Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the 
authority to negotiate trade agreements in goods with third parties was delegated by the Member States 
to the European Commission, subject to a mandate from the intergovernmental Council of Ministers that 
spelled out the relevant negotiating directives. 
7 
 
 
So how do institutionalists emphasising the depoliticisation of EU trade policy account 
for this apparent turn away from multilateralism towards bilateralism? The most 
popular approach relies on rational-choice institutionalism utilising a particular form of 
‘principal-agent’ analysis in which political actors are seen as largely insulated from 
societal pressures (Elsig, 2002; Kerremans, 2004; Nicolaïdis, 1999; Meunier, 2000, 
2007; van den Hoven, 2002; Elsig, 2007).  Accordingly, the ‘collusive delegation’ of 
policy-making authority from the principal (Member States in the Council) to the agent 
(the Commission) is subject to various control mechanisms to ensure that the latter acts 
subject to the mandate it has been set by the former. The key assumption, of course, is 
that there is a divergence of interests between principal and agent, on the basis of their 
respective functions as guardians of the national interest and drivers of further and 
deeper European integration (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Nicolaïdis and Meunier, 
2002; Pollack, 2003; Meunier, 2005; Billiet, 2006; van den Hoven, 2004). The 
application of principle-agent analysis to EU trade policy has lead to the conclusion that 
Global Europe is a product of the Commission’s and, more specifically, of DG Trade’s, 
efforts to continue exercising leadership – to varying degrees – in trade policy, 
especially vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers (Elsig, 2007; Meunier, 2007). 
 
While this literature does offer undeniable insight into the institutional dynamics that 
shape the EU’s trade policy, the underlying assumption of depoliticisation is 
nonetheless problematic. It is odd, for instance, that institutionalists hardly mention the 
role of interest groups – as either influencing Member States or the Commission – in 
formulating trade policy. Another characteristic of institutional accounts of EU trade 
policy is the tendency to overlook the wider international systemic context in which 
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trade diplomacy is embedded (see, for an exception, Sbragia, 2010). This oversight is 
particularly surprising given the voluminous IPE literature dedicated to the study of 
trade politics.  In our view, the IPE trade literature has much to say about the EU and 
arguably offers a more compelling and dynamic understanding of how trade politics 
actually works.5 Although the IPE trade literature – at least that situated within the 
mainstream of the discipline – has traditionally been subdivided into ‘second image’ or 
domestic-societal and ‘third image’ or systemic explanations, scholars have begun to 
explore the potential synergies between the two.6 Richard Baldwin (1993, 1997) was an 
early and perhaps the most famous exponent of this. During the 1990s, Baldwin 
advanced a ‘domino theory’ of regionalism, according to which the fear of trade 
diversion from a preferential trade agreement will prompt interest groups to lobby 
government to secure comparable market access to offset any potential loss of 
competitiveness. This sets a chain of ‘dominoes’ in motion, as progressively more states 
respond to corporate lobbying by joining the ‘free trade bandwagon’ (Gruber, 2001).  
 
Although Baldwin’s work was appropriate for early 1990s during the heyday of ‘open 
regionalism’, it has less to say about the partial and fragmented system of bilateral FTAs 
                                                 
5 There exists in the field of EU Studies an incipient literature which also seeks to problematise the 
narrative of depoliticisation, pointing to the role that interest groups play within EU trade governance 
(see, amongst others, DeBièvre, 2002; DeBièvre and Dür, 2005; Dür, 2007, 2008; Woll, 2006, 2008). 
Similarly, there have also been some studies of EU preferential trade policies that have paid attention to 
such dynamics (see, for example, Heydon and Woolcock, 2009). However, such work essentially borrows 
arguments from the wider IPE literature on trade policy. 
6 The terms ‘second image’ and ‘third image’ derive from International Relations theory – which IPE has 
traditionally drawn upon – and were coined by Kenneth Waltz (1959), who also identified ‘first image’ 
explanations as those located at the level of the individual. 
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that has emerged in the last few years. Here other scholars have pointed to the 
importance of market structures – in the form of imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) – in shaping firms’ preferences for regional and bilateral FTAs 
(Casella, 1996; Milner, 1997). In the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), for example, Kerry Chase (2003, 2005) argues that US firms favoured 
preferential over multilateral liberalisation precisely because the economic rents 
associated with IRS were restricted to those residing in the NAFTA trade area. This 
consideration was especially relevant for firms engaged in cross-border intra-industry 
and intra-firm trade because NAFTA’s rules of origin (among other provisions) served 
to restrict the benefits of location to North American firms. This, in turn, provided a 
strong incentive for extra-regional firms to push their own governments towards 
similar arrangements, thus providing further momentum to the proliferation of regional 
and bilateral FTAs. 
 
Relating these insights to our own case study, the key point is that not only are there 
theoretical grounds for thinking that export-oriented firms may favour preferential over 
multilateral liberalisation; the sensitivity of these firms to changes in the trade policies 
of other countries is also seen as crucial. Nowhere is this clearer than in recent 
scholarship on services and investment as drivers of competitive liberalisation. 
According to Mark Manger (2009, also 2008, especially, pp. 2459-60), investment in 
developing country services markets (‘mode 3’ service delivery in WTO parlance) – e.g. 
telecommunications, professional services, retail banking and other financial services, 
utilities and so on – is usually characterised by large economies of scale requiring major 
investments. In these circumstances, multinational firms will push for preferential 
access for two reasons. On the one hand, incumbent service operators which have 
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already incurred significant sunk costs will favour preferential liberalisation of 
investment because – even if applied on a non-discriminatory basis (which the lifting of 
foreign equity restrictions often is) – it provides ‘first-mover’ advantages. On the other 
hand and more importantly, where regulation is very important for a given sector, 
preferential liberalisation itself creates ‘first-mover’ advantages for potential entrants. 
This is because the elimination of regulatory restrictions previously blocking or 
hampering the operation of foreign service suppliers is usually carried out on a 
discriminatory basis. The exclusion of others from an FTA ensures that firms benefitting 
from its provisions may be able to establish a dominant position through ‘first-entry’. In 
the extreme cases of limited licensing – often found in telecommunications – and 
standard-setting latecomers may be completely prevented from entry or severely 
disadvantaged by the adoption of different regulations to that of their home market 
(Manger, 2009: 44-8). In short, the competitive logic of services liberalisation in 
emerging economies is precisely that which underpins the EU’s Global Europe trade 
strategy – and this, so we will argue, informs important aspects of its ‘development’ as 
well as its ‘commercial’ diplomacy. 
 
III. The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
At a glance, the EPAs would appear to substantiate a key element of the institutionalist 
account of EU trade policy, as relayed in the previous section. That is to say, in the same 
way that the ‘collusive delegation’ of trade policy-making authority underpinned the 
commitment to multilateral liberalisation at the expense of the protectionist interests of 
Member States, it had a not dissimilar effect on the ‘clientelist’ (Ravenhill, 1985) 
relationship which has traditionally characterised development cooperation between 
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the EU and ACP. As is well known, the Lomé convention (which preceded the Cotonou 
Agreement and hence the EPAs) was established in 1975 following the United 
Kingdom’s accession to the Common Market in 1973, which required extending the 
geographical focus of the Yaoundé Convention – which had offered reciprocal trade 
preferences to former African colonies of France and Belgium since 1963 – to include 
the Caribbean and Pacific Commonwealth states. Unlike the Yaoundé Convention, 
preferences under Lomé were granted on a non-reciprocal basis while commodity 
protocols for bananas, beef, rum and sugar offered eligible ACP states guaranteed prices 
in excess of those available on the world market. All told, the Lomé Convention was 
renewed on three separate occasions – 1981, 1985 and 1989 – but was ultimately 
deemed to have failed in its principal objectives of promoting economic growth and 
diversification (European Commission, 1996b; Gibb, 2000).  
 
Important as these policies failings were, however, the key catalyst for the demise of 
Lomé was a series of adverse legal rulings against the EU’s banana protocol under both 
the GATT and the WTO. In 1994 the GATT ruled that Lomé was inconsistent with the 
MFN clause because it did not constitute a ‘free trade area’ or ‘customs union’ (due to 
the lack of reciprocity) but nor was it consistent with the 1979 Enabling Clause 
(because it discriminated between developing countries). In response, the EU 
immediately sought and received a five-year waiver for Lomé (although this did not 
prevent further legal challenges to the banana regime) in advance of the introduction of 
the much-strengthened dispute-settlement mechanism in 1995 (Ravenhill, 2004; Heron, 
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2010).7 Although the EU possessed the option to seek a further waiver – for which there 
are numerous other precedents under both the GATT and WTO – it soon intimated that 
its intention would be to recast the entire ACP trade relationship in such a way as to 
make it ‘WTO compatible’. Accordingly, the Cotonou Partnership Act of 2000 settled on 
the formula of replacing Lomé with separate EPAs based on six ‘regions’ – the 
Caribbean; the Pacific; West; Central; Eastern and Southern; and Southern Africa (SADC-
minus) – as identified by the Commission.8 In order to make this possible, the EU would 
seek an extension to the WTO waiver (which was subsequently granted during the 2001 
Doha Ministerial in Qatar) in order to allow the ACP sufficient breathing space to 
prepare for the EPA negotiations, scheduled to begin in September 2002 and end no 
later than 31 December 2007.9 
 
                                                 
7 Under the WTO, the rules governing the granting of legal waivers were tightened up considerably, 
requiring a 77 per cent majority for approval as opposed to the 66 per cent that was the norm under the 
GATT 1947. 
8 In November 2007, the five countries of the East African Community (EAC) – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda – broke away from the East and Southern Africa ‘region’ and signed a separate 
interim agreement with the EU, thus creating a seventh ACP group. 
9 The Cotonou Agreement made special provisions for LDCs, which would be granted Lomé-equivalent 
duty- and quota-free preferences under what became the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) agreement of 2001. 
By including the handful of UN-designated LDCs that had been excluded from Lomé, the EBA effectively 
got around the issue of WTO incompatibility since the regime was now legally consistent with the 1979 
Enabling Clause. At the same time, however, this neat solution made the task of establishing region-wide 
EPAs even more problematic: with duty- and quota-free treatment now available to the LDCs through EBA 
there was very little incentive for them to abandon non-reciprocity in order to participate in the EPA 
process!  
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The significance of all of this, with respect to the more specific aims of the article, is that 
even though the trade component of the Cotonou Agreement was supposedly driven by 
the necessity of ‘WTO compatibility’ – specifically with Article XXIV of the WTO 
Agreement, which provides an exemption from MFN for ‘free trade areas’ – the 
negotiating remit of the EPAs included liberalisation commitments in a whole raft of 
‘trade-related’ areas like services, investment and intellectual property that were not 
covered by the original Lomé protocol and were thus not subject to WTO litigation.10 
The inclusion of services, investment and other trade-related issues in the EPA 
negotiations reflected a fundamental shift in EU trade policy built on a more aggressive 
approach towards penetrating overseas markets (European Commission, 1996a; Faber 
and Orbie, 2009). The key to this new trade strategy was not just the new ‘emphasis on 
the objective of third country market opening in the Community’s commercial policy’ 
(European Commission, 1996a, p. 4, emphasis in the original); it also signalled a more 
active role for pro-liberalisation European business interests – which had played a 
relatively negligible role in EU trade policy-making during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (Cowles, 1997) – in shaping the future trade agenda.11 This translated into 
an ambitious agenda which formed the basis for the EU’s Millennium – and later Doha – 
Trade Round objectives first enunciated at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996. The 
                                                 
10 Aside from the areas already mentioned, the Cotonou Agreement also mentioned provisions on 
competition policy, trade and environment and trade and labour standards (but omitted government 
procurement). That being said, these issues were not actively pursued by the EU until the arrival of Peter 
Mandelson as Trade Commissioner, as we shall see below. 
11 This went from feeding the Commission information to pursue cases in the context of WTO dispute 
settlement (see De Bièvre, 2002; Shaffer, 2006) to lobbying it on the position to take in the upcoming 
round of multilateral trade negotiations (see Brittan, 1999). 
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undoing of the EU’s ambitious WTO agenda, first at Seattle in 1999 and, later following 
the launching of the DDA in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 terrorists attacks, the 
Cancún Ministerial in 2003 led to a prolonged lull in the Round and considerable 
dampening of expectations amongst European policy-makers and business leaders 
(Young, 2007). Although it would take another three years before the announcement of 
Global Europe, the Cancún Ministerial was the key turning point in the Round for the EU 
and the beginning of the end of its nascent multilateralism first trade strategy. 
 
It was at this point that wider, systemic influences began to play a more prominent role 
in EU trade politics, as its two main rivals in emerging services and investment markets 
– the US and Japan – increasingly turned to bilateral trade diplomacy. After four decades 
of commitment to multilateralism, Japan signed its first FTA with Singapore in 2003, a 
‘basic accord’ with the Philippines in 2004 and had launched negotiations with South 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand by 2006 (Manger, 2005). The US, for its part, had by 2006 
signed an FTA with Singapore and was also negotiating with Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand as part of its policy of competitive liberalisation. Although the significance of 
the new bilateral activism was ultimately not lost on the European Commission (see, for 
example, European Commission, 2006a), the strategic calculation made under Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy’s leadership appeared to be that an ‘inclusive’ multilateral 
round would be more commercially advantageous to the EU, irrespective of the bilateral 
drift of its main competitors. Following the debacle at Cancún in 2003 – which 
eventually led, among other things, to the three most controversial Singapore Issues 
(competition policy, transparency in government procurement and investment) being 
dropped from the Doha agenda – the EU found itself having to respond to the 
acceleration of the US’s policy of competitive liberalisation. This policy shift was seen as 
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especially relevant because of the strong emphasis the US’s bilaterals placed on services 
and investment liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation (Wunsch-Vincent, 2003). It 
was therefore not surprising that the European services industry – which stood to lose 
out on ‘first mover’ advantages in the lucrative emerging markets of Asia and Latin 
America – was among the first to advocate a copy-cat strategy, calling for the EU to 
abandon the ‘moratorium’ on new FTAs even before the Cancún Ministerial had taken 
place (ESF, 2003). The representations made by the European Services Forum (ESF) and 
other industry lobbyists would soon find a sympathetic ear in the new Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson (who replaced Pascal Lamy in November 2004) and 
would in turn be reflected in the 2006 Global Europe strategy document. This envisaged 
a new generation of FTAs with a strong regulatory dimension focused on WTO plus 
issues (particularly the Singapore Issues of investment and public procurement) 
designed to match or exceed the gains attained by competitors. 
 
A good indication of the ESF’s influence with trade policy-makers was the degree to 
which Global Europe constituted a volte face when compared to a previous key policy-
making document, the ‘Trade and Competitiveness Issues Paper’ (for more details on 
this earlier document, see Siles-Brügge, 2011). This was particularly evident in services 
liberalisation. The Issues Paper had stated that ‘[s]ubstantial gains may be expected 
from further integration of the EU’s internal market, intuitively more likely than with 
regard to external liberalisation’ (European Commission, 2005, p. 24). However, 
following intense ESF lobbying this position was subsequently reversed in Global Europe 
(Telephone interview, European Commission official, 5 May, 2010), where it was argued 
that the EU’s new FTAs should strive for ‘the highest possible degree of trade 
liberalisation, including far-reaching liberalisation of services and investment’ 
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(European Commission, 2006d, p. 11). As a result, Global Europe was also accompanied 
by a key template on investment liberalisation, aimed at serving the export interests of 
European service suppliers (see Section IV). 
 
Returning now to the EPAs, although standard interpretations of the transition from 
Lomé to Cotonou focus on organisational changes and competing bureaucratic interests 
inside the European Commission (Holland, 2002; Ravenhill, 2004; Carbone, 2007; van 
den Hoven, 2007; Elgström and Pilegaard, 2008; Pilegaard, 2009), it is important to 
note that responsibility for the ACP had already moved from DG Development to DG 
Trade at the beginning of Lamy’s tenure in 1999 and at his insistence (Interviews, 
European Commission officials, Brussels, 16 and 23 September 2009). At this point, 
WTO plus issues had barely figured in the EPA negotiations and would not do so until 
two years into the negotiations (Interview, non-governmental organisation 
representative, Brussels, 2 October 2009).12 By contrast, the arrival of Peter Mandelson 
appeared to coincide with a convergence between the EU’s ‘commercial’ and 
‘development’ trade diplomacy against the backdrop of the collapse of Cancún and the 
acceleration of competitive liberalisation. Looking more closely at the issues of services 
and investment, we can see that the shift in approach to the EPAs dovetailed neatly with 
the rise of the Global Europe trade strategy. Significantly, this shift corresponded with a 
notable increase in the lobbying efforts of the ESF designed to ensure that future EPAs 
                                                 
12 Articles 21.1, 21.5 and 75 of the Cotonou Agreement refer to competition and investment, but in the 
context of regional and national economic development, not as further items for negotiation with the EU. 
Public procurement is not mentioned in the agreement at all. These omissions are replicated in the 
memorandum accompanying the 2002 EPA mandate (which is still of restricted circulation) (European 
Commission, 2002). 
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contained WTO plus provisions – as revealed in a letter to Mandelson dated November 
2007 which requested that he ‘ensure that the interim agreements contain binding 
commitments to continue negotiations [on services]’ (ESF, 2007b, p. 2). It was in this 
context that the services and investment provisions of the EPAs began to take shape – 
both in the ‘interim’ agreements signed with most of the ACP between 2007 and 2009 
(practically all of which contained ‘rendezvous clauses’ committing the parties to 
conclude a future services and investment agreement – see Table 1 below)13 and, in the 
case of CARIFORUM, a full-blown chapter and market access schedules in the EPA.  
Table 1: Services, Investment and other WTO Plus Issues in 
Interim EPAs (IEPAs) 
                                                 
13 Despite EU efforts, there has been practically no movement on any of these issues since the signing 
and/or initialling of the IEPAs. In this sense, the rendezvous clause deadlines, where present, have been 
relatively meaningless despite formally committing both parties to conclude negotiations on a certain 
issue by a particular date. This is nowhere as clear as in the case of Cameroon IEPA deadlines of 1 January 
2009, which are prior to the signing of the IEPA by Cameroon itself! 
 Status of 
Agreement (as of 
April 2011) 
Rendezvous 
Clauses for 
Services and 
Investment 
Rendezvous 
Clause for 
Competition 
Rendezvous 
Clause for 
Public 
Procurement 
Central Africa 
IEPA 
Only Cameroon 
(initialled Dec 2007, 
signed Jan 2009). 
Yes, specific 
‘services and 
establishment’ R-V 
clause (deadline: 1 
January 2009) 
Yes (deadline: 1 
January 2009) 
Yes (deadline: 1 
January 2009) 
Western 
Africa IEPAs 
 
Separate agreement 
with Ghana (initialled 
Dec 2007, signature 
pending). 
Yes (deadline: end 
of 2008) 
Yes (deadline: end 
of 2008) 
No 
Separate agreement 
with Côte d’Ivoire 
(initialled Dec 2007, 
signed Nov 2008). 
Yes (no deadline, 
but parties are 
‘encouraged’ to 
conclude a full 
EPA covering this 
issue by ‘end 
2008’) 
Yes (no deadline, 
but parties are 
‘encouraged’ to 
conclude a full EPA 
covering this issue 
by ‘end 2008’) 
Yes (no deadline, 
but parties are 
‘encouraged’ to 
conclude a full 
EPA covering 
this issue by ‘end 
2008’) 
East African Initialled Nov 2007, 
signature pending. 
Yes (no deadline) Yes (no deadline) Yes, but only 
transparency 
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Sources: the texts of various agreements. 
 
Underpinning the drive for a ‘consistent’ approach in bilateral services and investment 
negotiations, the so-called ‘Minimum Platform on Investment’ was a product of this 
setting. The next section, which addresses this agenda in more detail, describes the 
gradual but inexorable convergence between the EU’s ‘commercial’ and ‘development’ 
trade strategies. 
 
IV. The convergence of ‘commercial’ and ‘development’ trade diplomacy: Global 
Europe and the EU’s new bilateral services and investment agenda 
 
In making the case for a new generation of FTAs Global Europe identified a whole range 
of emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere deemed ripe for commercial 
exploitation. In contrast, at no point did it mention the ACP other than to suggest that 
these countries, along with Central America and the Andean Community, were 
Community 
IEPA 
(no deadline) 
Eastern and 
Southern 
Africa IEPA 
Signed by Madagascar, 
Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and 
Zimbabwe (Aug 2009; 
initialled by all Novber-
Dec 2007). Signature 
pending from Comoros 
and Zambia. 
Services but not 
investment (no 
deadline) 
No No 
Pacific IEPA Signed by Papua New 
Guinea (July 2009) and 
Fiji (Dec 2009). 
Originally initialled in 
Nov 2007 by both 
countries. 
No No No 
SADC (minus 
South Africa) 
IEPA 
Signed by Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, 
and Swaziland (June, 
2009, initialled by all 
Dec 2007) Signature 
pending from Namibia.  
Yes (deadline: 31 
December, 2008) 
Yes, but only 
cooperation (no 
deadline) 
Yes, but only 
cooperation (no 
deadline) 
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peripheral to Europe’s main commercial interests and that the EPAs and other similar 
agreements were designed to meet development rather than trade objectives. Global 
Europe thus provided a clear demarcation between the EU’s ‘main trade interests’ in 
which ‘economic factors must play a primary role’ (European Commission 2006d, pp. 
10-11) and its trade agreements with peripheral countries in which the primary motive 
was promoting sustainable development through the gradual regional and global 
integration of these countries into the world economy in a manner consistent with WTO 
rules (European Commission 2006d, p. 3). Even in the case of CARIFORUM – thus far the 
only comprehensive EPA to have been concluded – the Commission maintained the 
agreement was guided by development rather than commercial considerations: 
 
By explicitly taking into account the development objectives, needs and 
interests of the CARIFORUM region the EPA is very different from every 
other trade agreement negotiated up to now between developed and 
developing countries. This comprehensive approach is what constitutes 
the development dimension of the EPA and all the provisions of the EPA 
are designed to support it (European Commission, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Although the above statement would at first glance appear difficult to reject on the basis 
of straightforward economic interests, a closer reading of the relevant documents 
reveals that the ‘development’ and ‘commercial’ FTAs that have so far been negotiated 
under the auspice of Global Europe share far more in common than suggested. While 
institutionalists provide one possible explanations for this overlap in terms of 
functional integration and bureaucratic preferences, in this article we have chosen to 
focus instead on the wider systemic and political context. In so doing, we offer a 
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theoretical explanation for why the EU embraced competitive liberalisation, why WTO 
plus issues figured so prominently and why this strategy informed negotiations in 
‘development’ as well as ‘commercial’ FTAs. In this section of the article, we aim to 
substantiate these claims by focusing on perhaps the most innovative aspect of the EU’s 
post-Cancún trade strategy: the so-called ‘Minimum Platform’ on investment, a template 
for a chapter on ‘Establishment, trade in services and e-commerce’ that was to be 
included in the EU’s Global Europe FTAs.14 On the surface the Minimum Platform would 
appear to corroborate institutionalist arguments stressing principal-agent dynamics 
and functional integration. It did, after all, expand Commission competence to cover the 
negotiation of all ‘pre-establishment’ investment liberalisation, while ‘post-
establishment’ protection and promotion of investment remained the exclusive purview 
of Member States through their own bilateral investment treaties (Interview, European 
Commission official, Brussels, 22 September 2009).15 In our view, however, the real 
significance of the Minimum Platform for EU trade policy lay not so much with 
negotiating competence, as would be emphasised by institutionalists, but the stress 
placed on liberalisation in future FTAs. This is highlighted by the fact that the 
Commission has had full competence to negotiate liberalisation for ‘mode 3’ services – 
                                                 
14 The text of the Minimum Platform quoted in this article is that of a leaked, and now freely available, 
draft presented to the Council’s Article 133 Committee (responsible for trade policy) in July 2006, as the 
final text is still of ‘restricted’ circulation. However, it should be noted that the final text is unlikely to have 
changed very much from this draft as the EU’s subsequent FTA with Korea and EPA with CARIFORUM 
seem to mirror it quite closely (see below). Included with this draft was an explanatory memorandum, 
which is also cited below. 
15 Since then, of course, the Treaty of Lisbon has come into force, which in Article 207 does give the 
Commission sole authority to negotiate agreements on investment. 
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which account for the lion’s share of EU foreign direct investment (see Eurostat, 2008, p. 
17) – since the 2001 Treaty of Nice (for more on this, see Nicolaïdis and Meunier, 2002). 
 
To reiterate, then, what is most striking about the Minimum Platform was the emphasis 
placed on services and investment liberalisation within the context of the EU’s post-
Cancún trade strategy. The fact that it was referred to as a Minimum Platform was not 
only a reference to its nature as an institutional compromise between the Council and 
Commission:16 it also referred to the ‘minimum’ being sought from trade partners in 
future FTAs. In this respect, the emphasis placed by the Minimum Platform on the need 
for a ‘consistent’ approach – which is not something that has figured prominently to this 
day in FTA mandates in other areas like government procurement and intellectual 
property rights (Interviews, European Commission officials, Brussels, 29 April and 6 
May 2010) – is significant, pointing to a common set of drivers for agreements 
negotiated on the basis of its liberalisation provisions. That said, the intention was still – 
albeit on the basis of the Minimum Platform – to adapt the FTA negotiating mandate to 
the particular circumstances of a trading partner, particularly with a view to match any 
market access gains acquired by a competitor through an FTA or otherwise (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 2). This desire for competitiveness-driven adaptability was also 
reflected in a novel ‘review clause’ for investment, which, in the words of its drafters, 
was included ‘with a view to allow in the future a possible upgrading of establishment 
provisions’ (European Commission, 2006c, p. 2). 
                                                 
16 The term ‘minimum’ reflected a compromise between the Commission’s and Member States’ competing 
claims for competence in the sense that it provided the Commission with the ‘minimum’ tools necessary 
to effectively negotiate ambitious trade agreements (Interviews, European Commission officials, Brussels, 
September-October 2009). 
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The most significant innovation, however, was the Minimum Platform’s MFN clause 
covering establishment provisions (see Figure 1). Generally speaking, the purpose of 
such clauses in international trade agreements is to ensure that new trade preferences 
granted by a party to others are extended automatically to the signatories of a particular 
agreement. MFN forms the basis of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), with a general exemption in Article V for regional economic integration 
agreements and more specific exemptions listed under an Annex of the GATS. What is 
particularly telling in this case is not just the inclusion of the provision itself, but the 
nature of the MFN exemption in the Minimum Platform for preferences granted under 
regional economic integration agreements. Whereas under GATS Article V an MFN 
exemption exists for practically all such agreements (provided they have ‘substantial 
sector coverage’ and eliminate ‘substantially all discrimination’), in the Minimum 
Platform the wording is far more restrictive. It provides an MFN exemption only for a 
‘regional economic integration agreement requiring the Parties thereto to approximate 
their legislation’ (European Commission, 2006b, p. 7). Although, to an extent, this type 
of language can be seen as a means of overcoming the technical and legal complexities 
of negotiating rules of origin for services, facilitating the ‘multilateralisation’ of 
preferential services commitments (see Miroudot, Sauvage and Sudreau, 2010), the 
explanatory memorandum attached to the Minimum Platform spells out the EU’s 
primary motivations for including such a highly restrictive MFN clause quite clearly: 
By [wording the clause] so, the EU is in a position to obtain as many 
advantages as possible that could stem from other preferential 
agreements to which one of the EU's contracting parties would also be a 
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party (the EU should at least obtain the treatment granted by US FTAs) 
without prejudicing some EU preferential policies (ex: in the 
framework of the EEA [European Economic Area] or of EU-accession 
processes) (European Commission, 2006c, p. 2, emphasis added). 
 
Significantly, the MFN clause in the Minimum Platform is phrased in such a manner as to 
apply retroactively: in other words, it would affect all preferential treatment granted by 
the partner in question, even if this had been granted prior to the entry into force of the 
agreement with the EU. This marked stress on seeking (at least) parity with EU 
competitors – with the US singled out as a particular target – is not altogether 
surprising, given the context of the Minimum Platform proposals and their clear link to 
the Global Europe strategy. 
 
Figure 1: The MFN Clause in the Minimum Platform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2006b, p. 7). 
 
 
Article […] 
Most-favoured-nation treatment 
1. With respect to any measures affecting 
establishment covered by this Chapter, each Party 
shall accord to investors of the other Party a 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
to like investors of any third country. 
2. Treatment granted to investors of a third country 
by either Party arising from a regional economic 
integration agreement requiring the Parties 
thereto to approximate their legislation shall be 
excluded from the obligation of this provision […] 
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It is rare to find such a provision for services and/or investment in the EU’s previous 
bilateral trade agreements. Neither the EU-Chile FTA – widely heralded as a benchmark 
for future trade agreements by EU officials prior to Global Europe17 – nor an important 
draft EU-Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) FTA text from 2004 contained such 
a clause (European Commission, 2006c, p. 4). Even where such an MFN clause was 
included for establishment in services – such as in the EU’s FTA with Mexico – this 
followed the wording of the GATS more narrowly, providing an exemption for any 
‘agreements concluded by one of the Parties with a third country which have been 
notified under Article V of GATS’ (EC-Mexico Joint Council, 2001, p. 3). Similarly, 
although the EU-Mexico FTA contained a review clause for services, ostensibly to 
‘upgrade’ the agreement, the EU’s bilateral agenda at that time was subordinated to its 
multilateral trade strategy. The review of services provisions, which according to the 
review clause had originally been scheduled to take place in 2004, was postponed 
because both parties were interested in pursuing services negotiations at the 
multilateral level (O’Boyle, 2005). That is not to say that the services and investment 
provisions in either the EU-Chile or EU-Mexico FTA were insignificant; indeed, in the 
areas of telecommunications and financial services, there is evidence of strong interest 
group pressures seeking at least parity with US liberalisation efforts in the region 
(Manger, 2009). But the key difference is that these two FTAs were concluded at a time 
when the EU was still primarily targeting multilateral liberalisation with most corporate 
lobbying reflecting localised market pressures rather than the wider systemic forces 
that shaped Global Europe and the Minimum Platform.  
                                                 
17 In an interview conducted in March 2006 with an EU official on EU bilateral trade agreements, the 
official in question promptly produced a copy of this FTA and noted that it represented a ‘model’ 
agreement.  
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The inclusion of the review and MFN clauses as a ‘minimum’ requirement for future 
FTAs were thus significant policy innovations that underscored the post-Cancún 
sensitivity of EU policy-makers to the competitive systemic pressures found in global 
services markets. The fact that these two clauses were included under the rubric of 
establishment, moreover, underscored the importance of these pressures for mode 3 
service suppliers, clearly reflecting the ESF’s demands that future FTAs ‘should also 
include a clause guaranteeing that any preferential treatment granted to third countries 
in the future is automatically extended to the EU’ (ESF, 2007a, p. 2). Of course, the drive 
for ‘consistency’ also reflected a wider strategic aim of creating what Craig VanGrasstek 
(2000: 169-7) has called a ‘spiral of precedents’ intended to influence the post-DDA 
trade agenda at the multilateral level. But this is consistent with our broader argument 
in the sense that EU policy-makers were determined to match US gains though an 
equally ‘consistent’ and activist bilateral trade strategy. Most importantly, the fact that 
the Minimum Platform was used as the basis for the negotiation of the services and 
establishment provisions in the EU’s ‘development’ as well as its ‘commercial’ FTAs 
pointed to a noticeable convergence in the EU’s post-Cancún bilateral diplomacy. The 
degree of convergence can be best illustrated by comparing briefly the respective 
services and investment provisions contained in actual agreements. 
 
Table 2: Comparing the Services and Investment Provisions in 
the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU’s ‘Commercial’ FTAs 
 (Draft) FTA 
Mandates 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA EU-Korea FTA 
Single Services 
& Investment 
Chapter 
EU-India and EU-ASEAN 
mandates: ‘Title 3: Trade 
in Services, 
Establishment’ 
 ‘Title II: Investment, Trade in Services 
and E-Commerce’ 
‘Chapter Seven: Trade in 
Services, Establishment and 
Electronic Commerce’ 
MFN Clause for Retroactive clause sought Article 70. Does not apply equally to Article 7.14. Applies 
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Sources: the texts of various mandates and agreements. 
 
As Table 2 reveals, there are a number obvious similarities between the draft EU 
mandates for India and ASEAN and the EU-Korea FTA, on the one hand, and the 
CARIFORUM EPA, on the other. First, all of these agreements mirror the Minimum 
Platform in the sense of including services and investment under a single rubric. 
Commercial 
Establishment 
in both cases. 
 
EU-India mandate (Article 
23): 
‘EU investors and service 
suppliers shall be granted 
at least parity with the 
treatment granted to 
investors and service 
suppliers of any third 
country as regards cross-
border supply of services 
and establishment.’ 
 
 
EU-ASEAN mandate 
(Article 23): ‘Whenever 
an ASEAN partner has 
concluded another 
economic integration 
agreement with a third 
country which is not 
within the ASEAN region, 
EU investors and service 
suppliers shall be granted 
at least parity with the 
treatments granted to 
investors and service 
suppliers of this third 
country as regards to 
cross-border supply of 
services and 
establishment.’ 
both parties. Not retroactive. 
 
EU to offer full MFN (no economic 
integration agreement exemption). 
 
The ACP Parties only to offer MFN for 
agreements with ‘major trading 
economies’ (Article 70, paragraph 1b): 
‘any developed country, or any country 
accounting for a share of world 
merchandise exports above 1 % [...] or 
any group of countries acting 
individually, collectively or through an 
economic integration agreement 
accounting collectively for a share of 
world merchandise exports above 1.5 
% [...]’ (Article 70, paragraph 4). In this 
case, the EU and CARIFORUM are to 
enter into consultations to decide 
whether the Caribbean state(s) in 
question may deny the EU MFN 
treatment (Article 70, paragraph 5).  
 
MFN regional economic integration 
agreement exemption (Article 70, 
paragraph 2, applies only to 
CARIFORUM Party): ‘When a Party [...] 
concludes a regional economic 
integration agreement creating an 
internal market or requiring the 
parties thereto to significantly 
approximate their legislation with a 
view to removing non-discriminatory 
obstacles to commercial presence and 
to trade in services, the treatment that 
such Party or Signatory CARIFORUM 
State grants to commercial presences 
and investors of third countries [...] is 
not covered by the [MFN clause].’ 
equally to both parties. 
Not retroactive. 
 
MFN regional economic 
integration agreement 
exemption wording (Article 
7.14, paragraph 2): 
‘Treatment arising from a 
regional economic 
integration agreement 
granted by either Party to 
establishments and 
investors of a third party 
shall be excluded from the 
obligation in paragraph 1, 
only if this treatment is 
granted under sectoral or 
horizontal commitments 
for which the regional 
economic integration 
agreement stipulates a 
significantly higher level 
of obligations than those 
undertaken in the context 
of this Section as set out in 
[the schedule of specific 
services commitments].’ 
Review Clause 
for 
Establishment 
None. Article 74. ‘With a view to the 
progressive liberalisation of 
investments, the Parties shall review 
the investment legal framework, the 
investment environment, and the flow 
of investments between them […] no 
later than three years after the entry 
into force […] and at regular intervals 
thereafter.’ 
Article 7.16. As for the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA but with 
an additional provision:  
‘In the context of [this] 
Review […] the Parties shall 
assess any obstacles to 
investment that have been 
encountered and shall 
undertake negotiations to 
address such obstacles’. 
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Second, both the EU-Korea FTA and the CARIFORUM EPA include a similarly-worded 
review clause for services and establishment provisions that opens the door to a future 
upgrading of liberalisation commitments. Most importantly, however, the CARIFORUM 
EPA provides for an MFN clause for establishment in Article 70, with a restrictive 
exemption for regional economic integration agreements for the CARIFORUM Signatory 
Parties. All of these provisions are found in the EU-Korea FTA and in the draft 
mandates18 for the EU-India and EU-ASEAN FTAs (see European Commission, 2007a, b). 
This suggests common drivers for the EU’s bilateral trade agenda in services and 
investment as the Minimum Platform is a (relatively) consistently applied template, 
particularly in terms of the key policy innovations it introduced. Furthermore, the fact 
that the two draft FTA mandates do not include an MFN exemption for regional 
economic integration agreements underscores the point that the Minimum Platform is 
only ever the ‘minimum’ that is being sought from these FTAs. 
 
Despite this, the argument here is not that the EU has simply imposed commercially-
driven services and investment provisions on the ACP via the EPAs without resistance 
or contestation. Indeed, what is most striking about the political dynamics of the EPAs is 
that CARIFORUM – a region relatively well endowed with the bureaucratic capacity and 
supranational authority deemed necessary to negotiate region-wide and technically-
complex reciprocal trade agreements – effectively broke ranks with the rest of the ACP 
in signing a comprehensive EPA when others did no more than sign ‘goods only’ interim 
                                                 
18 Although they are only drafts, these mandates are unlikely to have been subject to much change in their 
current form (Interview, European Commission official, Brussels, 9 September 2009).  
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agreements.19 At least insofar as the CARIFORUM agreement is concerned, much 
appears to rest on a supposedly key difference between the services and investments 
chapters of the EPA and the Korea FTA and the draft mandates for India and ASEAN: 
namely, the principle of special and differential treatment (Telephone interview, 
CARIFORUM trade negotiator, Kingston, Jamaica, 8 January 2009; Interview, European 
Commission official, Brussels, 15 December 2009). This principle – which is enshrined 
in the Cotonou Agreement and is designed to meet the ‘special and differential’ needs of 
ACP service suppliers and (albeit subsequently, as investment did not feature in the 
Cotonou Agreement as an area for discussion) investors – is based on three separate 
concessions. First, even though the CARIFORUM Agreement grants full MFN treatment – 
there is no exemption for regional economic integration agreements as found in the EU-
Korea FTA – this only applies to FTAs concluded with a ‘major trading economy’ (see 
Table 2). As a result, it is possible to argue that the ‘non-reciprocal’ MFN provision may 
bring dynamic gains to CARIFORUM countries – which would benefit in the event that 
the EU signed an FTA with a third party without necessarily having to make further 
concessions. This, however, is offset by the precise wording of the clause (see also fn. 
21), which defines a ‘major trading economy’ to include not only developed countries 
but also developing countries like Brazil, China, India and Mexico – all of which possess 
                                                 
19 A superficial interpretation of this suggests that the small, service-based economies of the Caribbean 
recognised the potential economic benefits of a WTO plus agreement, but this reading is at odds with the 
region’s previous actions in other diplomatic settings, such as participation in various South-South 
coalitions aimed at preventing the inclusion of these very same issues within the Doha Round. A more 
sophisticated explanation for CARIFORUM’s decision to sign a comprehensive EPA is provided by Tony 
Heron (2010). 
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rapidly growing services markets.20 This has led some to argue that the MFN clause will 
diminish any future bargaining leverage that CARIFORUM would have in signing an FTA 
with a major developing county since the region would be unable to offer preference 
margins vis-à-vis the EU to any country or group of countries or would otherwise have 
to extend these trade benefits to the EU (ECLAC, 2008; Dièye and Hanson, 2008). As if to 
underscore this point, officials in the European Commission have justified the inclusion 
of the MFN clause for services and investment by stressing that they do not want the EU 
to be at a competitive disadvantage as a result of having signed EPAs (Interview, 
European Commission official, Brussels, 15 December 2009).  
 
The second aspect of special and differential treatment is said to reside in the non-
automaticity of the MFN clause, by which is meant that the negotiation of a subsequent 
FTA would not immediately precipitate the application of MFN – as in the case of the 
EU-Korea FTA – but rather lead to ‘consultations’ between the EU and CARIFORUM. In 
theory, this concession grants CARIFORUM significant flexibility in the application of 
MFN; yet it remains to be seen how far the region will be able to resist EU pressure to 
extend MFN treatment or liberalise investment further, given the power asymmetries 
inherent to the EU-ACP relationship. Indeed, the very fact that the MFN clause was 
                                                 
20 Although the Cotonou Agreement also required preference-receiving countries to grant to the EU any 
more favourable treatment offered to other developed countries, the CARIFORUM text extends this to 
advanced developing countries and regions which account for more than 1 per cent and 1.5 per cent of 
world trade respectively. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 
2008, p. 32) estimates that, on the basis of 2005 trade data, this provision would be sufficient to preclude 
CARIFORUM from signing an FTA with China, Brazil, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, Taiwan, ASEAN and 
MERCOSUR without offering MFN treatment to the EU.      
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retained in the CARIFORUM agreement – the issue was hotly contested during the 
negotiations and it remains one of the most controversial aspects of talks in the other 
ACP regions – speaks volumes for the asymmetrical power dynamics inherent in the 
EPA process (Elgström, 2000; Forwood, 2001; Stevens, 2006; Meyn, 2008; Heron, 2010; 
Bishop, Heron and Payne, forthcoming).21 The third and final concession to CARIFORUM 
is that the review clause discussed earlier is less onerous than that enshrined in the EU-
Korea FTA, in the sense that it does not include a commitment to address outstanding 
‘obstacles to investment’. In other areas, however, it appears that CARIFORUM 
negotiators actually obtained fewer concessions than their Korean counterparts in 
diluting the EU’s desired MFN clause: that is to say, the CARIFORUM text conforms more 
narrowly to the wording of the Minimum Platform than that found in the EU-Korea FTA; 
it is more restrictive, exempting fewer potential agreements from an invocation of the 
MFN clause (the EPA refers to an exemption for regional economic integration 
agreements creating an ‘internal market’ or ‘requiring the parties thereto to 
approximate their legislation’, whereas in the EU-Korea FTA, any agreement with a 
‘significantly higher level of obligations’ is excluded – see Table 2 for more details). In 
                                                 
21
 An alternative interpretation is that the presence of the MFN clause (alongside the review clause which 
is discussed below) actually served the commercial interests of CARIFORUM since its services industry 
would stand to benefit from subsequent EU FTAs based on higher levels of obligation (see also discussion 
above on dynamic gains); yet, it is significant that in the area of ‘mode 4’ (that is, the movement of natural 
persons – the aspect of services liberalisation in which CARIFORUM possessed the most offensive 
interests) the EPA text mentions neither MFN nor the review clause. Moreover, in extensive interviews 
conducted with CARIFORUM negotiators soon after the signing of the EPA, the acceptance of the MFN 
clause was mentioned only in terms of a necessary quid pro quo for EU concessions in areas such as 
‘mode 4’, delayed liberalisation schedules and product exemptions and preferential access to 
development aid.    
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sum, the EU’s supposed allowances for ‘special and differential’ treatment in services 
and investment do not appear to have proven too much of an obstacle in furthering its 
commercial objectives: in this case, ensuring at least parity with its most significant 
competitors in ‘mode 3’ service delivery. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this article was to shed light on the increasing convergence between the 
EU’s trade and development diplomacy with a specific focus on the EPAs. In so doing, 
we have gone against the grain of current orthodoxy in EU studies, with its emphasis on 
principal-agent dynamics in the context of politically-insulated policy structures, to 
highlight the ‘domestic-societal’ and ‘systemic’ influences behind the shift towards 
bilateralism. The motive here was not to provide an overarching or alternative 
conceptual frame for explaining the EPAs – or EU trade more generally – but to offer a 
means of thinking about the policy-making process in a way that addresses a specific 
research puzzle frequently identified but seldom explained adequately in the literature: 
that is, why have the EPAs gone beyond the original remit of ‘WTO compatibility’ and 
why do certain aspects of the emerging agreements bear so much similarity to the EU’s 
supposedly more commercially-oriented FTAs? Our solution to this puzzle has been to 
situate the EPAs within the wider context of EU trade policy and therein identify 
services and investment as key drivers of preferential liberalisation – and to reveal the 
extent to which this agenda has shaped the content of the EU’s ‘development’ as well as 
‘commercial’ FTAs. Of course the actual implementation of these agreements, including 
provisions for services and investment liberalisation, is some way off and cannot be 
guaranteed at this stage. This is especially the case with the CARIFORUM EPA. But this 
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does not detract from our key finding that in principle the two agreements share a 
virtually identical approach to services and investment – the Minimum Platform – which 
reflects a determination on the part of the EU to match or exceed the liberalisation gains 
of its commercial rivals. Clearly the arguments that we have rehearsed in this article 
require additional refinement – and it remains to be seen how far further empirical 
study will serve to substantiate and broaden our findings. For now at least, we have 
shed further light on some of the commercial imperatives underpinning preferential 
liberalisation – an issue that is frequently dealt with in the extant IPE trade literature 
implicitly but not always explicitly. In the case of EU studies, the article has 
demonstrated some of the insights that can be gleaned from looking beyond the 
idiosyncrasies of the EU to the wider commercial and political context that defines its 
policy choices. More particularly, we have illustrated the extent to which EU trade 
policy is in fact more permeable to interest group and systemic influences than usually 
acknowledged, which, in our view, is a necessary first step in bringing its study into the 
political economy mainstream. 
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